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Abstract. The stability of federal systems is a thorny issue. Several scholars have attempted to come to
grips with this problem and have proposed mechanisms or institutions which may contribute to the
stabilization of federal systems. In many instances, however, the underlying mechanisms and micro-
foundations are poorly speciﬁed. In this paper I build upon existing models dealing with decentralization
and secession to incorporate unequal income distributions and externalities of public goods. Based on this
some insights may be derived on the appropriate mechanisms to foster federal stability.
JEL Classification: H77, H41, C72
Key words: federalism, income, distribution, secession
1. Introduction
Few scholars would contest that federal systems may suﬀer from a lack of stability.
Hicks’s (1978) and Watts’s (1998) lists of failed federal systems serve as suﬃcient
empirical illustration, and several prominent theoretical arguments (e.g., Riker 1964,
1996; Bednar 1997; Kollman and Page 1997; Filippov et al. 2004) underline this
point. Thus, a major challenge to scholars of federalism is to elucidate what may
contribute to the stability of federal systems.
Several scholars have attempted to provide answers to this question. Riker (1964),
for instance, had the hunch that political parties played an important role in assuring
federal stability. This element is elaborated upon by Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1997)
and Filippov et al. (2004) inmore detail.McGarry andO’Leary (2003), analyzing a set
of federal systems, come to the conclusion that some sort of power-sharing and con-
sociational arrangements make federalism stable.2 Bednar (2004) on the other hand,
and following on the literature relating federalism with constitutional review (e.g.,
Lijphart 1999), emphasizes the role of the judiciary in upholding the federal bargain.
While some of these attempts rely largely on generalizations (e.g., Gurr 2000;
McGarry and O’Leary 2003),3 others aim at providing micro-foundations with the
help of theoretical models. While these models inform us at least in part on some
elements which may strengthen the stability of federal arrangements, many elements
and links still have to be uncovered.
In this paper I propose to build upon Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model of
political and economic integration,4 to elucidate some aspects of federal stability.
More precisely, I try to assess the eﬀects of diﬀerences in average income between
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regions and externalities, elements largely neglected in Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
As I am able to show, income diﬀerences make secession a very attractive option for
richer regions in a federal system. Only if negative externalities of secession oﬀset
these advantages do income diﬀerences not encourage secession. Before presenting
these results I will discuss in the next section the main arguments concerning the
elements which may strengthen federal stability. In section three I present several
models which deal either directly or indirectly with the issue of federal stability.
Section four is devoted to the discussion of extensions to Alesina and Spolaore’s
(2003) model, while section ﬁve oﬀers some concluding remarks and an outlook for
further work.
2. Enhancing Federal Stability
The most challenging task in research on federal systems is certainly determining
the mechanisms that might enhance the stability of these arrangements. The
seminal work by Riker (1964) was clearly already preoccupied by this important
question. His analytical approach suggested that political parties, and the way in
which the latter were organized and integrated in federal systems, could contribute
to federal stability. What many subsequent authors (e.g., Filippov et al. 2004)
noted, however, was that the mechanisms underpinning these arguments were
largely unspeciﬁed.
Similarly, in the inductive approach used by McGarry and O’Leary (2003) the
exact mechanisms which might make consociationalism a good addition to federal
systems are left unspeciﬁed.5 In their research they simply try to assess what
distinguishes federal systems that survived from those that failed to do so. According
to McGarry and O’Leary (2003) the most discriminating feature between these two
sets of federal systems is the presence of consociational features. In the absence of a
clear theoretical understanding of the mechanisms leading consociational elements
to contribute to federal stability, however, this claim has to be taken with some
reservation.
More promising in this respect appear formal approaches which attempt to sketch
out precisely the mechanisms making federal systems more stable. For instance,
Filippov et al. (2004) provide theoretical elements going beyond Riker’s (1964)
original claim. In their theoretical model the driving force is the degree to which
politicians pursue the interests of their regionally based voters, or whether they may
diﬀer from this mandate. In the latter case, federal stability is better assured.
Similarly, Bednar (2004) oﬀers a theoretical model which demonstrates in much
detail under what circumstances supreme courts may contribute to federal stability.
This is a welcome contribution to the largely descriptive arguments appearing in the
literature.6
While these theoretical models make important contributions to our understanding
of the mechanisms allowing for or contributing to federal stability, many questions
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still remain. Some answers to these questions may be found in more general models
dealing with economic and political integration (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 2003) or
work on secession (e.g., Young 1998).
3. Models of Federal Stability
Themost dramatic challenge to a federal system is obviously the secession of parts of its
territory. Young (1998) oﬀers a brief discussion of this literature and analyses some
very simple games of secession. A drawback ofmost of the models (largely two-by-two
normal form games) Young (1998) discusses is that they hardly allow for assessing
institutional elements which might make secession less likely. More promising along
these lines are explicit models of secession, like for instance the work by Bolton and
Roland (1997) and Bordignon and Brusco (2001). The latter authors especially focus
on the optimal secession rules which constitutions should contain.
An important tension in this respect is discussed by Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
In their model of political and economic integration they are able to determine the
optimal size of nations from the perspective of a welfare-maximizing social planner.
In this ‘‘optimal world,’’ however, individuals living at the periphery of an entity are
tempted to secede.7 When ‘‘voting on borders’’ is possible Alesina and Spolaore
(2003, 31–52) ﬁnd that the number of nations is most often larger and thus sub
optimal. ‘‘Voting on borders’’ is obviously nothing else than secession in this case.
Secession might be staved oﬀ by paying individuals living on the fringes of a nation
some transfer payments. But the question then arises, as Alesina and Spolaore (2003)
show and Dudley (2004) discusses, what will make government stick to its promise to
continue paying transfers once secession has been staved oﬀ. This tension oﬀers a
nice example of the commitment problems that are of central importance in federal
systems (e.g., Bednar 1997; Bednar et al. 2001).
While building on a model like Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) already allows for
some important insights concerning federal stability, some limitations should not be
forgotten. Three elements seem to be crucial. First, as Besley and Coate (2003)
clearly show the assumption that public goods have to be distributed uniformly in
centralized systems is hardly an accurate starting point to assess the merits of federal
and centralized systems. Even in centralized states a public good, e.g., a bridge, will
beneﬁt mostly a particular region and not the entire nation. Second, Besley and
Coate (2003) also stress the importance of spillovers in the provisions of public
goods. Finally, also the assumption of a uniform distribution of economic wealth or
income may be misleading when assessing federal stability and secession in a model
of political integration.
Thus, in their model Besley and Coate (2003) ﬁnd that under the assumption of
spillover eﬀects of public goods and unequal regions, the tradeoﬀ between central-
ization and decentralization becomes much more complex.8 Again, this seems to
suggest that issues of federal stability relate closely to diﬀerences in preferences,
resources and potential spillovers of public goods.
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4. Unequal Societies and Federalism in a Model of Political Integration
While limited by some constraining assumptions, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) still
provide an interesting framework to analyze various issues related to federalism,
even though their chapter on this topic is rather short. An interesting result in that
regard is that democratically deﬁned borders are sub optimal, i.e., there are too
many nations, provided that transfer-payments are not possible to stem secession. By
extension, this must also hold for the number of units in a federal system. The
authors in their chapter on federalism (or elsewhere in their book) do, however, not
address this issue directly. Their analysis of federalism in addition suﬀers from two
constraining assumptions. On the one hand the continuous nature of preferences
over public goods stands in contrast to the lumpy clusters of preferences which most
certainly exist in multiethnic, multireligious, multinational etc. societies.9 Related to
this, the resources and thus income is hardly distributed uniformly across the whole
territory, as is implicit in Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) analyses. Especially when
dealing with regional diﬀerences, supposedly to be solved by federal arrangements,
not only tastes for public goods may diﬀer across space, but incomes and available
resources as well.10
On the other hand, as Besley and Coate (2003) clearly show, the exclusion of
spillover eﬀects may question many conclusions of Alesina and Spolaore (2003). This
omission may surprise to some degree, since Alesina and Spolaore (2003, 140)
discuss externalities in the introduction to their chapter on federalism.
Thus, in what follows I alter Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model to allow for
income diﬀerences between regions and externalities. First I will sketch Alesina and
Spolaore’s (2003) model and show how I introduce unequal incomes in their model. I
then present results showing how diﬀerences in income aﬀect incentives for secession
and changes in the provision of public goods. Finally, I will show how externalities
aﬀect the conclusions reached under the assumption of income diﬀerences but no
spillover eﬀects.
Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model assumes that individuals can be placed on a
real line [A, C] (with A=0 and C=1) and their position reﬂects their tastes for public
goods. Public goods are produced at points on the same real line reﬂecting their
characteristics. Thus, individuals prefer ceteris paribus public goods produced closer
to their location on the real line. Apart utility from public goods, individuals also
have a common income y and pay a uniform tax t.
To introduce income diﬀerences between regions in this model I assume that in the
entity deﬁned by the real-line [A, C] (with A=0 and C=1) average income equals
y ¼ R
C
A
yidi. This entity is divided by B 2 ½A;C. in two regions with possibly diﬀerent
average incomes. Average income in region 1 is equal to
RB
A
yidi ¼ y1, while in region 2
it equals
RC
B
yidi ¼ y2. Without loss of generality I assume that y2  y  y1.
This change in the basic setup of Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model requires a
second change related to the issue of taxation. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) assume
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per capita taxes, which in the context of equal incomes have a direct equivalent in a
proportional tax, Thus, 1 assume that a proportional tax t is perceived on income,
instead of a per capita tax as in Alesina and Spolaore (2003), if only one public good
(a) is provided the change to a proportional tax rate results in the following utility
for individual i:11
ui ¼ yið1 tÞ þ g aali ð1Þ
In this equation li corresponds to the distance between individual i and the location
where the public good is provided, thus reﬂecting diﬀerences in preferences. a reﬂects
the extent to which individuals experience disutility from public goods provided
‘‘away’’ from their ideal point, while g represents the utility of the public good
provided.12 Thus, average utility in a territorial unit [A, C] equals:
u ¼ yð1 tÞ þ g a
ZC
A
lidi ð2Þ
In a situation where two public goods (a and b) are provided, possibly at diﬀerent
levels of jurisdictions like in federal systems, the utility for individual i is equal to:
ui ¼ yið1 tÞ þ g aalai  ablbi ð3Þ
4.1. Unequal Incomes, Federalism, and Secession
Under the assumptions of a proportional tax and possibly income diﬀerences
between two regions, I assess how diﬀerent types of public good provisions and
ﬁnancing aﬀect tax rates and average income in the two regions. To assess these
diﬀerences, I consider four scenarios about how two public goods j ðj 2 fa; bgÞ are
ﬁnanced13 and provided. Nj indicates in how many jurisdictions good j is provided.
In scenario (i) Na=Nb=1 thus both goods are centrally provided and ﬁnanced with
a uniform tax rate, In scenario (ii) I assume that Na=1 and Nb=2 while the public
goods are still ﬁnanced through a uniform tax rate.14 Scenario (iii) is identical to the
previous one, except that ﬁnancing public good b is done at the local level. Finally, in
scenario (iv), which might be dubbed secession, Na=Nb=2 and both goods are
ﬁnanced at the local level.
I analyze these four scenarios under the assumption that the lower level jurisdic-
tions perfectly match the diﬀerences in income.15 To compare the eﬀects of income
diﬀerences I will assess whether the tax rates and average paid taxes change in the
richer and poorer region. I do so because these are the only diﬀerences compared to
the results obtained under the original assumptions from Alesina and Spolaore’s
(2003) model. In addition, I will also determine whether the average utility in the
richer and poorer region increases from one scenario to the next.
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Scenario (i) Under this scenario the provision of the two public goods j 2 fa; bg
with ﬁxed kj and size-depending varying cj costs will generate the total costs
c ¼ ka þ kb þ ca þ cb. These costs are ﬁnanced through taxes t  y, thus the tax rate
is equal to t ¼ kaþkbþcaþcby . Compared to Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model there
appears no diﬀerence in the utility gains from the two public goods.
Scenario (ii) In this scenario taxes are still perceived centrally, but Na=1 and
Nb=2. In that case the costs for providing the two goods are
c ¼ ka þ 2 kb þ ca þ cb. Thus, the tax rate increases to t ¼ kaþ2kbþcaþcby an in-
crease compared to scenario (i) of kby in both regions. This increase in the tax
burden can only be optimal if the provision of public good b in the two regions
makes individuals better oﬀ, because it can be better targeted to their preferences.
The average disutility from public good b under scenario (i) for individuals in the
richer region ði 2 ½A;BÞ is equal to aa 1B2 þ ab 1B2 ,while it decreases to aa 1B2 þ ab B4
under scenario (ii). Thus,individuals in the richer jurisdiction are on average better
oﬀ under scenario (ii) if ab 23B4 > kb
y1
y where the latter part of the equality corre-
sponds to the average tax increase. Quite clearly, the richer region is more likely to be
better oﬀ under scenario (ii) if the region is rather small (small B) and if its average
income y1 is not too high.
In the second jurisdiction ði 2 ½B;CÞ the average disutility is
aa
1þð1þ2BÞ2
8ð1BÞ þ ab 1þð1þ2BÞ
2
8ð1BÞ in scenario (i) but decreases to aa
1þð1þ2BÞ2
8ð1BÞ þ ab 1B4 in
scenario (ii) Thus the disutility decreases by ab B
2
4ð1BÞ which has to oﬀset the increased
tax burden of kb
y2
y for the poorer region to be better oﬀ. Thus, the poorer region is
more likely to be better oﬀ under this scenario if the richer region is large (B larger)
and its average income y2 is not too high.
Scenario (iii) In this scenario the tax rates diﬀer between the two jurisdictions, Let
tk ¼ ta þ tkb where ta is the centrally perceived tax to ﬁnance public good a, while tkb is
the tax rate used to ﬁnance public good b in jurisdiction k. Following from above,
the common tax rate to ﬁnance public good a at the central level is obviously
ta ¼ kaþcay while the tax rate to ﬁnance public good b in jurisdiction 1 is t1b ¼ kbþcbBy1B .
Thus the total tax rate in jurisdiction j =1 is t1 ¼ kaþcay þ kbþcbBy1B .
Comparing this tax rate to the one obtained in scenario (ii) suggests that decen-
tralized taxation makes jurisdiction 1 better oﬀ regarding taxes if
ka þ 2 kb þ ca þ cb
y
>
ka þ ca
y
þ kb þ cbB
y1B
ð4Þ
or after some straightforward simpliﬁcations:
2 kb þ cb
y
>
kb þ cbB
y1B
ð5Þ
Multiplying through and noting that 2 kby1 þ cby1  cby > 0 implies that
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B >
Kby
2 kby1 þ cbðy1  yÞ
ð6Þ
Inspecting equation (6) suggests that if there are no income diﬀerences between the
two jurisdictions (i.e., y1 ¼ y) then B has to exceed 12. But given that in Alesina and
Spolaore’s (2003) framework the jurisdictions are of equal size, this implies that
decentralized taxation is not preferred from a tax perspective under the assumption
of equal incomes. If incomes diﬀer between jurisdictions, however, then for rich and
suﬃciently large regions (i.e., B suﬃciently close to 12) decentralized taxation is
preferable from a tax perspective. For given income diﬀerences it is also apparent
that the required size of the richer jurisdiction to proﬁt from decentralized taxation
decreases as the ﬁxed costs (kb) and the varying costs (cb) of providing public good b
increase.
In this scenario the average change in utility due to changes in tax
kb 1B  2y
1
y
 
þ cb 1 y
1
y
 
has to be negative, since compared to scenario (ii) the
provision of the two public goods remains unaltered. This implies that the richer
region is more likely to be better oﬀ under scenario (iii) if B and y1 are relatively
large.
Similarly, for the poorer jurisdiction the change in the tax rate will equal
kb 1
y2ð1BÞ 
2
y
 
þ cb 1y2 
1
y
 
. Thus, kb 1ð1BÞ  2y
2
y
 
þ cb 1 y
2
y
 
has to be negative for
the poorer jurisdiction to be on average better oﬀ. This is more likely if B tends to be
small and y2 large.
Compared to Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) analyses income diﬀerences may raise
demands for decentralized taxation in cases where equal incomes would have not
lead to such demands in richer jurisdictions. But obviously, the other side of the coin
is that the poorer jurisdiction would have to levy higher taxes to provide the same
public good, especially, because the poorer jurisdiction is assumed to be larger. As
the analyses show this might still be preferable on average, provided the richer region
is rather small. But exactly this same aﬀect would make this tax scheme less
advantageous for the richer region. Similarly, the eﬀects of the average incomes in
the two regions are countervailing.
Scenario (iv) In this scenario (of secession) Na=Nb=2 and public goods are both
ﬁnanced locally. Thus the total cost for the two public goods in jurisdiction 1 is
c1 ¼ ka þ kb þ Bðca þ cbÞ which has to be ﬁnanced through taxes. Consequently the
tax rate in jurisdiction 1 will equal t1 ¼ kaþkbþBðcaþcbÞ
y1B
.
Comparing again this tax rate to the one obtained in scenario (iii) suggests that
secession makes jurisdiction 1 better oﬀ than decentralized taxation if
ka þ ca
y
þ kb þ cbB
y1B
>
ka þ kb þ ðca þ cbÞB
y1B
ð7Þ
or after some straightforward simpliﬁcations:
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ka þ ca
y
>
ka þ caB
y1B
ð8Þ
After simplifying and since kay1 þ cay1  cay > 0 it follows that
B >
kay
kay1 þ caðy1  yÞ
ð9Þ
If no income diﬀerences exist, (i.e. y1 ¼ y) then equation (9) shows that B has to
exceed 1 to make secession proﬁtable from a pure tax rate perspective. As income
diﬀerences appear, however, secession becomes attractive for the richer jurisdiction
compared to decentralized taxation. Again, higher ﬁxed (ka) and varying (ca) costs
for providing good a make secession more attractive even for smaller jurisdiction.
(i.e., the required value for B decreases).
The change in the tax rate from scenario (iii) to scenario (iv) is equal to kaþcaB
y1B
 kaþcay
in jurisdiction 1, which results in an average change of utility of kað1B  y
1
y Þ þ cað1 y
1
y Þ
due to the taxes. In parallel, the average disutility from public good a under scenario
(iii) for individuals i 2 ½A;B is equal to aa 1B2 þ ab B4, while it decreases to aa B2 þ ab B4
under scenario (iv). Thus, individuals in the richer jurisdiction are on average better
oﬀ under scenario (iv) if aa 23B4 > kað1B  y
1
y Þ þ cað1 y
1
y Þ By the deﬁnition of the
average incomes the changes in tax rate and average tax paid are always negative,
making secession in all cases proﬁtable for the richer region.
In the poorer jurisdiction the tax rate will increase by kað 1
y2ð1BÞ 
1
yÞ þ cað 1y2 
1
yÞ
This expression is positive, indicating that in the secession scenario, the poorer
jurisdiction will be forced to increase its tax rate. Thus the average tax increase will
be equal to kað 1ð1BÞ  y
2
y Þ þ cað1 y
2
y Þ. At the same time the disutility of good a will
decrease from aa
1þð12BÞ2
8ð1BÞ in scenario (iii) to aa
1B
4 in scenario (iv) Thus the disutility
decreases by aa B
2
4ð1BÞ which has to oﬀset the increased tax burden of
kað 1ð1BÞ  y
2
y Þ þ cað1 y
2
y Þ. The eﬀect of the size of the richer region (B) on this
inequality depends on the values of aa and ka, while larger y2 make it more likely that
the poorer region also proﬁts from secession.
4.2. Externalities, Unequal Incomes, Federalism, and Secession
In Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model the utility resulting from the provision
of public goods comprises a positive term g and negative term )ajli reﬂecting
heterogeneity in preferences (equation (3)) with regard to public good js. Implicit in
this formulation is also the fact that each individual only obtains utility from one
public good of each type. To allow for spillover eﬀects, the term g has to be
decomposed in utility stemming from goods provided in individual i’s jurisdiction,
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and the utility obtained from a public good provided in another jurisdiction. Simi-
larly, the disutility from a public good not corresponding to ones preferences also
has to be disaggregated. Thus for the case in which public good A is produced
centrally and public good B decentralized in two jurisdictions individual i’s utility
with externalities corresponds to16
ui ¼ yið1 tÞ þ g aalai  ablbi þ eðgb0  ab0 lb0iÞ ð10Þ
where b¢ corresponds to the public good b provided in another jurisdiction and e
measures the importance of externalities. In the case of secession and allowing for
externalities individual i’s utility would look as follows:
ui ¼ yið1 tÞ þ g laiðaa þ abÞ þ eðga0 þ gb0  la0iðaa0 þ ab0 ÞÞ ð11Þ
where lai and la¢i reﬂect the distance for both public goods a and b, respectively al¢
and b’, since they will be produced jointly at the same location. With these
changes it is now possible to assess how externalities aﬀect the four scenarios
discussed above.
In scenario (i) the average utility in both regions would not be aﬀected, since both
public goods are centrally provided. Thus, no externalities appear in this scenario.17
In scenario (ii) the local provision of public good b creates externalities for indi-
viduals in both regions. In the richer region, each individual’s utility changes by e
ðgb0  ab0lb0iÞ. The average utility change equals eðgb0  ab0 12Þ. This expression is either
positive or negative, depending on the values of gb¢ and ab¢. But neither B nor the
income distribution aﬀects these values. Thus the conclusions discussed in the
absence of externalities still hold ceteris paribus for the richer region. In the poorer
region the changes in individual and average utility are identical, thus the same
conclusion holds.
In scenario (iii), since the provision of the two public goods remains unaltered
compared to scenario (ii), externalities do not aﬀect the individuals’ and average
utilities in both regions. Thus, the conclusions discussed above still hold.
Finally, in scenario (iv), the secession scenario, in both regions the individu-
als’utilities change by eðga0  aa0la0iÞ. As above the average utility change equals
eðga0  aa0 12Þ, which can either be positive or negative, depending on the values of ga¢
and aa¢. Again, neither B nor the income distribution aﬀects these values. This
implies that if the externalities are positive, or only slightly negative not to oﬀset the
gains from secession in terms of taxes and decreased disutilities, the richer region is
still better oﬀ under this scenario. If the externalities of public good a are strongly
negative, the richer region might be worse oﬀ under secession.
For the poorer region the externalities from public good amay oﬀset the utility loss
from the tax increases necessary due to secession. If the externalities are not large
enough or even negative, then the poorer region will be worse oﬀ under all
circumstances.
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5. Discussion and Conclusion
This simple extension of Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model suggests that income
diﬀerences across regions may lead to demands in richer regions for decentralization
or even secession. The introduction of income diﬀerences into their model suggests
that these aﬀect the tax rates perceived under decentralized taxation. These changes
in tax rates make particular arrangements for ﬁnancing and providing public goods
more or less attractive. What appeared generally is that in the absence of externalities
elements, which make more decentralization more attractive for the richer region,
were systematically those, which made this less attractive to the poorer region.
Hence, in decentralization the interests of the two regions are likely to be counter-
vailing in the absence of externalities.
Compared to a federal arrangement with decentralized taxation, secession proved
to be preferable for the richer region under the assumption of no externalities. The
poorer region, however, proﬁts from secession only under particular circumstances,
for instance when its average income y2 is rather large.
These conclusions are only partly aﬀected by considering possible externalities. If
the latter are positive (negative), they simply increase the attractiveness of providing
public goods locally (centrally). Especially in the case of secession compared to a
federal arrangement the eﬀects of spillovers are interesting. If they are suﬃciently
large and positive, they might ensure that even the poorer region beneﬁts from
secessions. If the spillovers are suﬃciently large and negative, they might make
secession for both regions unattractive. Given that one of the public goods that is
provided centrally even in federal systems is security, it is likely that the externalities
of this good are negative in a process of secession. If military forces are established in
both jurisdictions for providing security, they will also negatively aﬀect security in
the respective neighboring region. Thus, it might be this expected negative exter-
nality, which might stave oﬀ secession.
Given that decentralized taxation is not systematically proﬁtable for the two
regions, it might also be the case that centralized taxation might help staving oﬀ
secession. Since, secession is always proﬁtable for the richer region compared to
decentralized taxation in the absence of externalities, centralized taxation might
under certain circumstances be a better option than secession.
Thus the extension to Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) model that I proposed in this
paper shows that income diﬀerences as well as externalities may have considerable
eﬀects in the realm of decentralization and secession. However, the extension
discussed here in some sense only provides the context for a broader analysis of
federal stability. More precisely, Besley and Coate (2003) are right in arguing that
only an analysis of political decision-making will allow for a better understanding of
the consequences of decentralization and secession.
What the analysis present above suggests is that in the presence of income diﬀer-
ences the push toward decentralization and secession becomes more important.
Thus, the burden put on institutions allowing to uphold a federal bargain increases.
To ensure against secession, however, one might hope on the negative spillover
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eﬀects of public goods mostly provided by nations, and the unattractiveness of
secession compared to centralized taxation.
Notes
1. This paper partly draws on research funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No.
5004-0487882/1). An earlier version entitled ‘‘Federalism and the Size of Nations’’ was presented at
the conference ‘‘Micro-Foundations of Federal Institutional Stability’’ at Duke University (Dur-
ham, April 30–May 1, 2004). Comments by participants at this conference and greatly appreciated.
First version: March 2004, this version: November 1, 2004
2. This position is also discussed in the report by the Section for peace and Reconciliation Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (2003).
3. While McGarry and O’Leary (2003) discuss federal arrangements proper, Gurr (2000) argues that
autonomy arrangements have mitigated many societal conﬂicts and civil wars. Autonomy arrange-
ments, however, are hardly any diﬀerent from arrangements of asymmetric federalism.
4. Dudley (2004) oﬀers a stimulating and interesting review of this book.
5. This ﬁnding obviously also stands in some contrast to Elazar’s (1985) view on federalism and con-
sociationalism.
6. Lijphart (1999) brieﬂy discusses the most important work in this area.
7. Related to this point is the discussion of federalism by Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2003) in the con-
text of their selectorate theory.
8. This obviously under the assumption that even in centralized systems particular public goods may
be destined exclusively to speciﬁc regions.
9. Alesina and Spolaore (2003, 60ﬀ) discuss brieﬂy the implications of polarization, but refrain from
developing this idea in more detail.
10. Le Breton and Weber (2001) provide a nice illustration for this when depicting the ﬁscal capacity
of the German La¨nder. Similarly, the fact that ‘‘greed’’ and lootable resources appear closely re-
lated to civil wars (e.g., Collier et al. 2003) underpins this point.
11. This equation diﬀers only in the ﬁrst term compared to Alesina and Spolaore (2003), where it
would correspond to y  t .
12. When more than one public good is provided, g represents the overall utility of all provided public
goods.
13. Two public goods are required to allow for a federal system according to Riker’s (1964) deﬁnition.
This case is also employed by Alesina and Spolaore (2003) in their analysis of federalism.
14. This scenario addresses Besley and Coate’s (2003) point that even in a centralized system the provi-
sion of public goods may diﬀer across the territory.
15. My hunch is that this is not a constraining assumption, since I only need diﬀerences in average in-
comes for the results that follow.
16. This formulation follows in part Besley and Coate’s (2003) assumptions.
17. Obviously, I abstract here from the fact that the two regions are neighbors to other regions and na-
tions. These externalities, however, remain constant across all the scenarios discussed here and thus
do not aﬀect the conclusions.
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